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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In some electoral systems, citizens vote twice: in a ﬁrst ballot they select a
subset of candidates, over which they cast a ﬁnal vote in a second ballot.
The system for electing the French President, where the two candidates who
get more votes in a ﬁrst round run are admitted to the second round, is
possibly the best known example. But variants of this dual ballot (or run oﬀ)
system are used in many other countries, for example in Latin America, in the
US gubernatorial primary elections, and in many local elections, including
Italian municipal and regional elections (see Cox 1997 for examples, and
below for the Italian case)1. How does the dual ballot system diﬀer from
the more common single ballot plurality rule election, where candidates are
directly elected at the ﬁrst round? In spite of its obvious relevance, this
question remains largely unadressed, particularly when it comes to studying
the policies enacted under these two systems.
This paper contrasts dual vs single ballot elections under plurality rule,
focusing on the policy platforms that get implemented in equilibrium. We
analyze a model with sincere voting where parties with ideological preferences
commit to a one dimensional policy before the elections. The number of
parties is partly endogenous. We start out with four parties. Before the
elections, however, parties choose whether or not to merge, and bargain
over the policy platform that would result from the merger. The central
result is that the dual ballot moderates the inﬂuence of extremist parties
and voters on the equilibrium policy. The reason is that the dual ballot
reduces the bargaining power of the extremist parties that typically appeal
to a smaller electorate. Intuitively, with a single ballot and under sincere
voting, the extremist party can threaten to cause the electoral defeat of the
nearby moderate candidate if this refuses to merge with him. Under a dual
ballot this threat is empty, provided that when the second vote is cast some
extremist voters are willing to vote for the closest moderate (rather than
abstain). This result holds even if renegotiation among parties is allowed
between the two ballots. Finally, the model also predicts that the number
1A variant of the run oﬀ system is the alternative vote, which is used for lower house
state and federal elections in Australia. Here, voters only vote once, but list their pref-
erences for all parties from ﬁrst to last. The party with the fewest ﬁrst preferences is
eliminated and its votes are redistributed to the remaining parties according to the next
preference listed. The process is repeated until there is only a party which is then declared
the winner.
2of parties running for elections is larger in the dual compared to the single
ballot.
In light of these theoretical results, we then study data on Italian mu-
nicipal elections. In Italy, Mayors in municipalities below (above) 15,000
inhabitants are elected according to a single (dual) ballot rule respectively.
The data on dual ballot elections reveal that voters are indeed mobile be-
tween candidates: a relevant share of the voters supporting the excluded
candidate seem to participate in the second ballot. Moreover, as predicted
by the theory, the number of candidates for Major is larger under the dual
ballot system, compared to the single ballot.
These results have important implications for the design of democratic
institutions. Political extremism is often counterproductive, because it re-
duces ex-ante welfare if voters are risk averse, and because sharp disagree-
ments could disrupt decision making in governments or legislatures. In this
respect, dual ballot electoral systems have an advantage over single ballot
elections, as they moderate the inﬂuence of extremist groups.
The existing literature on these issues is quite small. Some informal con-
jectures have been advanced by institutionally oriented political scientists
(Sartori 1995, Fisichella, 1984). Analytical work has mostly asked whether
variants of Duverger’s Law or Duvergers’s Hypothesis on the equilibrium
number of parties carry over to the run oﬀ system (Messner and Polborn,
2004, Cox, 1997 and, more recently Callander, 2005).2. Less attention has in-
stead been devoted to the speciﬁc question of which policies are implemented
in equilibrium. An exception is Osborne and Slivinsky (1996). In a model
with sincere voting and ideologically motivate candidates, they study equilib-
rium conﬁguration of candidates and policies in the two systems, concluding
that policy platforms are in general more dispersed under single ballot plu-
rality rule than in a dual ballot system. They also show that the number of
active candidates is larger under the dual ballot (Callander (2005) reaches the
2The terminology is due to Riker (1982). Duverger’s Law states that plurality rule leads
to a stable two party conﬁguration, while Duverger’s Hypothesis suggests that several
parties conﬁguration should emerge from proportional representation. As the dual ballot
system does not necessarily lead each party to maximize its vote share in the ﬁrst round, the
run oﬀ system has been traditionally grouped with proportional voting. Duverger’s Law
can be rationalized as a result of strategic voting (see Feddersen, 1992 and the literature
discussed there) and there is an extensive theoretical literature on strategic behaviour
in single ballot elections under diﬀerent electoral rules (Myerson and Weber, 1993; Fey,
1997). Very little is known about strategic voting in dual ballot elections (see however
Cox 1997 and his cautios remarks).
3opposite conclusion, however). But in keeping with the Duverger’s tradition,
their result is obtained in a long run equilibrium where all possibilities for
proﬁtable entry by endogeneous candidates are exausted. We are instead in-
terested to discuss this issue in a shorter term perspective, where pre-existing
policy oriented parties bargain over policy under the two diﬀerent electoral
systems. Finally, Wright and Riker (1989) present some empirical evidence
suggesting that run oﬀ systems are indeed characterized by a larger number
of running candidates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model. Sections 3 and 4 study coalition and policy formation under single
and dual ballot elections respectively, deriving the main results. Section 5
discusses an extension. Section 6 describes the Italian municipality electoral
system and tests the predictions on the number of candidates. Section 7
concludes. Formal proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Voters







where q ∈ [0,1] denotes the policy and tJ is group J0sb l i s sp o i n t . T h u s ,
voters lose utility at a constant rate if policy is further from their bliss point.
The bliss points of each group have a symmetric distribution on the unit
interval, with: t1 =0 ,t 2 = 1
2 − λ, t3 = 1
2 + λ, t4 =1 , and 1
2 ≥ λ>1
6.
Groups 1 and 4 will be called ”extremist”, groups 2 and 3 ”moderate”. The
assumption λ>1
6 implies that the electorate is polarized, in the sense that
each moderate group is closer to one of the two extremists than to the other
moderate group. We discuss the eﬀects of relaxing this assumption in the
next sections.
The two extremist groups have a ﬁxed size α. The size of the two moderate
groups is random: group 2 has size α+η, group 3 has size α−η, where α is
a known parameter with α>α , and η is a random variable with mean and
median equal to 0 and a known symmetric distribution over the interval [−e,
e], with e>0. Thus, the two moderate groups have expected size α, but the
4shock η shifts voters from one moderate group to the other. We normalize
total population size to unity, so that α + α = 1
2.
The only role of the shock η is to create some uncertainty about which of
the two moderate groups is largest. Speciﬁcally, throughout we assume:
(α − α) >e (A1)
α/2 >e (A2)
Assumption (A1) implies that, for any realization of the shock η, any moder-
ate group is always larger than any extreme group. Assumption (A2) implies
that, for any realization of the shock η, t h es i z eo fa n ym o d e r a t eg r o u pi s
always smaller than the size of the other moderate group plus one of the
extreme groups. Again, we discuss the eﬀects of relaxing these assumptions
in Section 5. The realization of η becomes known at the election and can be
interpreted as a shock to the participation rate.
Finally, throughout we assume that voters vote sincerely for the party
that promises to deliver them higher utility.
2.2 Candidates
There are four political candidates, P =1 ,2,3,4, who care about being
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where σ>0 is the relative weight on policy preferences, and E(r) are the
expected rents from being in government. The ideological policy preferences
of each candidate are identical to those of the corresponding group of voters:
tP = tJ for P = J. Rents only accrue to the party in government, and
are split in proportion to the number of party members. Thus, r =0f o ra
candidate out of government, r = R if a candidate is in government alone,
r = R/2 if two candidates have joined to form a two-member party and won
the elections (as discussed below, we rule out parties formed by more than
two party members). The value of being in government, R>0, is a ﬁxed
parameter.
52.3 Policy choice and party formation
Before the election, candidates may merge into parties and present their
policy platforms. We will speak of mergers between candidates as ”parties”,
although they can be thought of as electoral cartels or coalitions of pre-
existing parties. Once elected, the governing party cannot be dissolved.
If a candidate runs alone, he can only promise to voters that he will
implement his bliss point: qP = tP. If a party is formed, then the party
can promise to deliver any policy lying in between the bliss points of its
party members; thus, a party formed by candidates P and P0 can oﬀer any
qPP0 ∈ [tP,t P0]. But policies outside this interval cannot be promised by this
coalition. This assumption can be justiﬁed as reﬂecting lack of commitment
by the candidates. A coalition of two candidates can credibly commit to any
qPP0 ∈ [tP,t P0] by announcing the policy platform and the cabinet formation
ahead of the election; to credibly move its policy platform towards tP, the
coalition can tilt the cabinet towards party member P. But announcements
to implement policies outside of the interval [tP,t P0]w o u l dn o tb ee x - p o s t
optimal for any party member and would not be believed by voters (see
Morelli (2002) for a similar assumption).
We assume that parties can contain at most two members, and these
members have to be adjacent candidates3. Thus, say, candidate 2 can form
a party with either candidate 3 or candidate 1, while candidate 1 can only
form a party with candidate 2. This simplifying assumption captures a re-
alistic feature. It implies that coalitions are more likely to form between
ideologically closer parties, and that moderate parties can sometimes run to-
gether, while opposite extremists cannot form a coalition between them, as
voters would not support this coalition. This gives moderate candidates an
advantage - see below.
Candidates can bargain only over the policy q that will be implemented
if they are in government. As we already said, rents from oﬃce are ﬁxed
and are split equally amongst party members4. Bargaining takes place before
knowing the realization of the random variable η that determines the relative
3See Morelli (2002) for a similar modelling choice and Axelrod (1970) for a justiﬁcation
of this assumption.
4If rents were large and wholly contractible at no costs, then each coalition would form
at the policy platform that maximizes the probability of winning for the coalition and
rents would be used to compensate players and redistribute the expected surplus. But if
rents were limited or contractible at some increasingly convex costs, then our results below
would still hold qualitatively as coalitions would want to bargain over policies too.
6size of groups 2 and 3, and agreements cannot be renegotiated once the
election result is known.
Bargaining takes place according to a two stage process. At the ﬁrst
stage, candidates 2 and 3 bargain with each other to see if they can form a
moderate party. Either 2 or 3 is selected with equal probability to be the
agenda setter. Whoever is selected (say 2) makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
of a policy q23 to the other moderate candidate. If the oﬀer is rejected, the
game moves to the second stage. If the oﬀer is accepted, then the moderate
party is formed and the two moderate candidates run together at the election.
Voters then vote over three alternatives: candidate 1, who would implement
q = t1; candidate 4, who would implement q = t4; and the party consisting of
candidates {2,3}, who would implement q = q23. Whoever wins the election
then implements his policy and enjoys the rents from oﬃce.
A tt h es e c o n ds t a g e ,t h em o d e r a t ea n dt h ee x t r e m ec a n d i d a t e s ,h a v i n go b -
served the oﬀers in the ﬁrst stage, simultaneously bargain with each other (1
bargains with 2, while 3 bargains with 4) to see if they can form a moderate-
extreme party. In each pair of bargaining candidates, an agenda setter is
again randomly selected with equal probabilities. For simplicity, there is
perfect correlation: either candidates 1 and 4 are selected as agenda setter,
or candidates 2 and 3 are selected. This selection is common knowledge (i.e.
all candidates know who is the agenda setter in the other bargaining pair).
The two agenda setters simultaneously choose whether to make a take-it-or-
leave-it policy proposal to their potential coalition partner, or to refrain from
making any oﬀer. This action is only observed by the candidate receiving
(or not receiving) the oﬀer, and not by his counterpart on the other side of
1/2. The candidates receiving the oﬀer simultaneously accept it or reject
it. If the proposal is accepted, the party is formed and the two candidates
run together at the election on the same policy platform. If the proposal
is rejected (or if no oﬀer is made), then each candidate in the relevant pair
stands alone at the ensuing election, and his policy platform coincides with
his bliss point5. Again, whoever wins the election implements his policy and
enjoys the rents from oﬃce.
Thus, this second stage can yield one of the following four outcomes.
If both proposals are accepted, voters have to choose between two par-
ties ({1,2},{3,4}), each with a known policy platform. If both proposals
5Hence, we assume that a candidate (=party) always runs, either alone, or in a coalition
with the other candidate (=party).
7are rejected (or never formulated), then voters vote over four candidates
({1},{2},{3},{4}), each running on his bliss point as a policy platform.
If one proposal is accepted and the other rejected, then voters cast their
ballot over three alternatives: either ({1,2},{3},{4}), or ({1},{2},{3,4}),
depending on who rejects and who accepts. Note that renegotiation is not al-
lowed; that is, if say party {1,2} is formed, but 3 and 4 run alone, candidates
1 and 2 are not allowed to renegotiate their common platform.
To rule out multiple equilibria in the second stage game sustained by
implausible out of equilibrium beliefs, we impose the following restriction
on beliefs. Call the player who receives the merger proposal the ”receiving
candidate”. Each receiving candidate entertains beliefs about whether the
other two players, on the opposite side of one half, have entered into a merger
agreement or not. We assume such beliefs by each receiving candidate do
not depend on the contents of the proposal that he received. Since each can-
didate only observes the proposal addressed to himself, and not the proposal
that was made to the other receieving candidate, this is a very plausible as-
sumption. This restriction corresponds to what Battigalli (1996) deﬁnes as
independence property, and in a ﬁnite game it would be implied by the notion
of consistent beliefs deﬁned by Kreps and Wilson (1992) in their reﬁnement
of sequential equilibrium.
2.4 Electoral rules
The next sections contrast two electoral rules. Under a single ballot rule, the
candidate or party that wins the relative majority in the single election forms
the government. Under a closed dual ballot rule, voters cast two sequential
votes. First, they vote on whoever stands for election. The two parties
or candidates that obtain more votes are then allowed to compete again in
a second round. Whoever wins the second ballot forms the government.
We discuss additional speciﬁc assumptions about information revelation and
renegotiation between the two rounds of election in context, when illustrating
in detail the dual ballot system. Section 5 discusses alternative assumptions
about the relative size of extremist vs moderate voters.
83 Single ballot
We now derive equilibrium policies and party formation under the single
ballot. The model is solved by working backwards.
Suppose that the second stage of bargaining is reached. Any candidate
running alone (say candidate 1 or 2) does not have a chance of victory if he
runs against a moderate-extremist party (say, of candidates {3,4} together).
The reason is that, by assumption (A2), the size of voters in groups 3 and
4 together is always larger than the size of voters in group 1 or 2 alone,
for any shock to the participation rate η. Moreover, given the assumption
that λ>1/6, voters in the moderate group 3 are ideologically closer to
extremist candidate 4 than to the other moderate candidate, 2. Hence, all
voters in groups 3 and 4 prefer any policy q ∈ [t3,t 4]t ot h ep o l i c yt2 (and
symmetrically for group 1,2). In other words, the party {3,4} always gets
the support of all voters in groups 3 and 4 for any policy the party might
propose, and this is the largest group in a three party equilibrium. This in
turn implies that a two-party system with extremists and moderates joined
together is the only Nash equilibrium of the game. It also implies that the
agenda setter, whoever he is, always proposes his bliss point, and his proposal
is always accepted at the Nash equilibrium. Hence (a detailed proof is in the
appendix):
Proposition 1 If stage two of bargaining is reached, then the unique Nash
equilibrium is a two-party system, where the moderate-extremist parties ({1,2},{3,4})
compete in the elections and have equal chances of winning. T h ep o l i c yp l a t -
form of each party is the bliss point of whoever happens to be the agenda
setter inside each party. Hence, with equal probabilities, the policy actually
implemented coincides with the bliss point of any of the four candidates.
Note that, if all candidates run alone, the extremist candidates do not
have a chance. By assumption (A1), the moderate groups are always larger
than the extremist groups, for any shock to the participation rate η. Hence,
in a four candidates equilibrium, the two moderate candidates win with prob-
ability 1/2 each. This means that the moderate candidates 2 and 3 would be
better oﬀ in the four candidates outcome than in the two-party equilibrium.
In both situations, they would win with the same probability, 1/2, but in the
former case they would not have to share the rents in case of a victory. But
the two moderate candidates are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma. In a four
9candidates situation, each moderate candidate would gain by a unilateral
deviation that led him to form a party with his extremist neighbor, since
this would guarantee victory at the elections. Hence in equilibrium a two
party system always emerges. This in turn gives some bargaining power to
the extremist candidates. Even if they have no chances of winning on their
own, they become an essential player in the coalition. Here we model this by
saying that with some probability they are agenda setters and impose their
own bliss point on the moderate-extremist coalition. When this happens, the
equilibrium policies reﬂect the policy preferences of extremist candidates, al-
though their voters are a (possibly small) minority. But the result is more
general, and would emerge from other bargaining assumptions, as long as the
equilibrium policy platforms reﬂect the bargaining power of both prospective
partners.6
Next, consider the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game. Here, one of the
moderate candidates is randomly selected and makes a policy oﬀer to the
other moderate candidate. If the oﬀer is accepted, the three parties conﬁg-
uration ({1},{2,3},{4}) results. If it is rejected, the two-party outcome in
stage two described above is reached. Thus, the three party outcome with a
centrist party can emerge only if it gives both moderate candidates at least
as much expected utility as in the two party equilibrium of stage two. This
in turn depends on the ideological distance that separates the two moderate
candidates.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that λ>1/4. In this case, the two moderate can-
didates are so distant from each other that they cannot propose any policy
in the interval [t2,t 3] that would be supported by voters in both moderate
groups. Hence, the centrist party {2,3} would lose the election with cer-
tainty, and it is easy to show that both moderate candidates would then
prefer to move to stage two and reach the two party system described above.
Suppose instead that 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6. Here, for a range of policies that
6Without the restriction on beliefs introduced in the previous section, if λ<1/4t h e r e
would be other equilibria sustained by implausible out of equilibtium beliefs. Speciﬁcally,
the restriction is needed to rule out beliefs of the following kind; suppose that candidates 1
and 4 are the agenda setters; candidate 2 believes that 3 and 4 will not merge if candidate
1 proposes to 2 to merge on a platform q12 ≤ ˆ q , and he believes that 3 and 4 will merge
if instead the oﬀer received by 2 is q12 > ˆ q. Such beliefs would induce a continuum of
two party equilibria indexed by ˆ q. But since the oﬀers received by 2 reveal nothing about
what players 3 and 4 are doing, such beliefs are implausible and violate the requirement
of stochastic independence as discussed by Battigalli (1996).
10depends on λ, the centrist coalition {2,3} commands the support of moderate
voters in both groups and, if it is formed, it wins for sure. From the point of
view of both moderate candidates, this outcome clearly dominates the two
party outcome that would be reached in stage two, since they get higher
expected rents and more policy moderation. Hence, the centrist party is
formed for sure, and its policy platform depends on who is the agenda setter
in the centrist party.
We summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 2 If 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4, then the unique equilibrium outcome un-
der the single ballot is as described in Proposition 1. If 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6, then
the unique equilibrium outcome under the single ballot is a three party system
with a centrist party, ({1},{2,3},{4}). The centrist party wins the election
with certainty, and implements a policy platform that depends on the identity
of the agenda setter inside the centrist party.
We can then summarize the results of this section as follows. If the
electorate is suﬃciently polarized (λ>1
4), the single ballot electoral sys-
tem penalizes the moderate candidates and voters. A centrist party cannot
emerge, because the electorate is too polarized and would not support it.
The moderate candidates and voters would prefer a situation where all can-
didates run alone, because this would maximize their possibility of victory
and minimize the loss in case of a defeat. But this party structure cannot be
supported, and in equilibrium we reach a two-party system where moderate
and extremist candidates join forces. This in turn gives extremist candidates
and voters a chance to inﬂuence policy outcomes. If instead the electorate is
not too polarized 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6, then a single ballot system would induce
the emergence of a centrist party. Extremist candidates and voters lose the
elections, and moderate policies are implemented.7
Finally, what happens if, contrary to our assumptions, λ ≤ 1/6? This
would mean that polarization is so low that the moderates’ bliss points are
closer to each other than to those of the respective extremists. In this case,
the second stage game described above has no equilibrium (under the re-
striction on beliefs discussed in the previous section). Thus, to study this
7Because moderate voters are in larger number than extremists and λ ≤ 1
2,t h i sa l s o
means that the sum of total expected losses by citizens from equilibrium policies are larger
when λ>1
4 and the centrist party cannot be formed, than when λ ≤ 1
4 and the centrist
party can be formed.
11case we would need to relax the restricti o no nb e l i e f s .E v e ni nt h a tc a s et h i s
s e c o n ds t a g eg a m ew o u l dn o tb er e a c h e d , however, since the two moderates
would always ﬁnd it optimal to merge into a centrist party at the ﬁrst stage.
The overall equilibrium would then be the same as with 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6. The
proof is available upon request.
4D u a l b a l l o t
We now consider a closed dual ballot. The two candidates or parties that
gain more votes in the ﬁrst round are admitted to the second ballot, that
in turns determines who is elected to oﬃce. To preserve comparability with
the single ballot, we start with exactly the same bargaining rules used in the
previous section. Thus, all bargaining between candidates is done before the
ﬁrst ballot, under the same rules and the same restrictions on beliefs spelled
out in section 2. In particular, candidates can merge into parties only before
the ﬁrst ballot. Once a party structure is determined, it cannot be changed
in any direction in between the two ballots. We relax this assumption in the
next subsection.
The features of the equilibrium depend on other details of the model that
were left unspeciﬁed in previous sections. In particular, here we add the
following assumptions.
First, we decompose the shock η to the participation rate of moderate
voters in two separate shocks, each corresponding to one of the two ballots.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that in the ﬁrst ballot the size of group 2 voters
is ¯ α + ε1, while the size of group 3 voters is ¯ α − ε1. In the second ballot,
the size of group 2 voters is ¯ α + ε1 + ε2, while the size of group 3 voters is
¯ α−ε1−ε2. The random variables ε1 and ε2 are independently and identically
distributed, with a uniform distribution over the interval [−e/2,e / 2]. This
speciﬁcation is entirely consistent with that assumed for η in the previous
section. In fact, it is convenient to deﬁne here η = ε1 + ε2. Exploiting the
properties of uniform distributions, we obtain that the random variable η
now is distributed over the interval [−e,e], it has zero mean and a symmetric


















2e2 for − e ≤ z ≤ 0
12Thus the ﬁrst ballot reveals some relevant information about the chances of
victory of one or the other moderate parties in the second ballot. This point
is further discussed in the next subsection but plays no role here, since all
bargaining is done before any voting has taken place.
Second, inside each extremist group, a constant fraction δ ≤ 1o fv o t e r si s
ideologically ”attached” to a candidate. These attached individuals vote only
if ”their” candidate participates as a candidate on its own or as a member
of a party. If their candidate does not stand for election (on its own, or as a
member of another party), then they abstain. This assumption plays no role
u n d e rt h es i n g l eb a l l o t ,s i n c ea l lc a n d i d ates always participate in the election,
either on their own or inside a party. The fraction δ of attached voters should
not be too large, however, otherwise there is no relevant diﬀerence between
single and dual ballot elections. In particular, we assume:
2e/α >δ (A3)
We discuss the implications of this assumption below.
Finally, we retain assumptions (A1) and (A2) in section 2. Clearly, these
assumptions play an important role, because they determine who wins ad-
mission to the second round. In particular, assumption (A1) implies that
a moderate candidate running alone always makes it to the second round,
irrespective of whether the other moderate candidate has or has not merged
with his extremist neighbor.
This does not mean that moderate candidates always prefer to run alone,
however. The reason is that, as spelled out above, a fraction δ of extremist
voters is ”attached” and will abstain in the second ballot if their candidate
is not running. Merging with extremists thus presents a trade-oﬀ for the
moderate candidates: a merger increases their chances of ﬁnal victory, be-
cause it draws the support of these attached voters; but if they win, they get
less rents and possibly worse policies. In the single ballot system, moderates
faced a similar trade-oﬀ. But it was much steeper, because the probability
of victory increased by 1/2 as a result of merging. Under the dual ballot,
instead, the fall in the probability of victory is less drastic, and moderate
candidates may choose to run alone. Whether or not this happens depends
on parameter values, and on the expectations about what the other moderate
candidate does.
Speciﬁcally, consider all possible party conﬁgurations before any voting
has taken place, given that stage two of bargaining is reached. In the sym-
metric case in which no new party is formed and four candidates initially
13run for elections, the two moderates gain access to the last round and each
moderate wins with probability 1/2. In the other symmetric case of a two
party system, each moderate-extremist coalition wins again with probability
1/2. In the asymmetric party system, instead, the Appendix proves:
Lemma 1 The probability that the moderate candidate (say 2) wins in the
ﬁnal round if it runs alone, given that his opponents (3 and 4) have merged,





Thus, the parameter h measures the handicap of running alone in a dual
ballot system, given that the opponents have merged. Note that, by (A3),
1/2 >h>0. Thus, assumption (A3) implies that the moderate candidate
has a strictly positive chance of winning in the second round if it runs alone,
even if his opponents have merged. If (A3) were violated, then the double
ballot would not oﬀer any advantage to the moderate candidates, and the
equilibrium would be identical to the single ballot. Intuitively, if the share of
their attached voters is larger than any possible realization of the electoral
shock, the extremist candidates retain all their bargaining power and the
electoral system does not make any diﬀerence. More generally, under (A1),
(A2) and (A3), the handicap h increases with the fraction of attached voters,
δ, and the size of extremist groups, α, while it decreases with the range of
electoral uncertainty, e.
We are now ready to describe the equilibrium, if stage two of bargaining
is reached. The appendix proves that it depends on whether the handicap
of running alone, h, is above or below speciﬁc thresholds, ¯ H>H
¯
and on
the identity of the agenda setter inside the two prospective coalitions. More
precisely:
Proposition 3 Suppose that A(1),A (2), A(3) hold and stage two of bar-




4(2σλ+R) the handicap of running alone is so small that
both moderate candidates always prefer not to merge with the extremists. The
unique equilibrium is a four-party system where all candidates run alone, and
each moderate candidate wins with probability 1/2 with a policy platform that
coincides with his bliss point.
(ii) If h> ¯ H ≡ R
4(2σλ+R/2), the handicap of running alone is so large that
both moderate candidates always prefer to merge with the extremists. The
unique equilibrium is a two party system where moderates and extremists
merge on both sides and each party wins with probability 1/2. If the moder-
ate candidate is the agenda setter, then the policy platforms of each coalition
14coincide with the moderates’ bliss points. If the extremist candidate is the
agenda setter, then the policy platforms of each coalition lie in between the
extremist and the moderate bliss points, and the distance between the equilib-




≤ h ≤ ¯ H, then two equilibria are possible. Depending on the
players’ expectations about what the other candidates are doing, both a two
party or a four party system can emerge in equilibrium. In a two party
system, the policy platforms are as described under point (ii).
These results are very intuitive. If the handicap of running alone is very
large, the two electoral systems are similar, as moderates still always wish to
merge with extremists, who then retain some bargaining power. But if this
handicap is small, then the bargaining power of the extremists is entirely
wiped out, and the dual ballot system induces that four party equilibrium
which was unreachable under a single ballot because of the polarization of the
electorate. In a sense, with the double ballot, voters are forced to converge
to moderate platforms, by eliminating the extremist candidates from the
electoral arena. In intermediate cases, anything can happen, given candidates
expectations on other agents’ behavior. But notice that even in a two party
system, the coalitions between moderates and extremists generally form on
a more moderate policy platform compared to the single ballot case. The
bargaining power of moderates has increased, because a two-ballot system
gives them the option of running alone without being sure losers, and this
forces the extremist agenda setters to propose a more centrist policy platform.
Next, consider stage one of the bargaining game. As before, one of the
moderate candidates is randomly selected and makes a take-it-or-leave-it
policy oﬀer to the other moderate. If the oﬀer is rejected, the outcome
described in Proposition 3 is reached.
As with a single ballot, the equilibrium depends on how polarized is
the electorate. If voters are very polarized (if 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4), then there
is no policy in the interval [t2,t 3] that would command the support of all
moderate voters. Hence, the centrist party {2,3} would lose the election
with certainty, and both moderates prefer to move to the second stage of
the bargaining game. Hence, if 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4t h eﬁnal equilibrium is as
described in Proposition 3.
Suppose instead that 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6. Here the centrist party would win for
sure for a range of policy platforms. But this needs not imply that the centrist
15party is formed, because such a party would still have to reach a policy
compromise and dilute rents among coalition members. If the handicap from
running alone is suﬃciently small (if h<H
¯
), then both moderate candidates
know that the four party system emerges out of the second stage game (see
Proposition 3). Hence, by linearity of payoﬀs, they are exactly indiﬀerent
between forming the centrist party with a policy platform of q =1 /2o r
running alone in a four party system. A slight degree of risk aversion would
push them towards the centrist party, but an extra dilution of rents in a
coalition government compared to the expected rents if they run alone would
push them in the opposite direction. If instead the handicap from running
alone is suﬃciently large (h> ¯ H), then the moderates are strictly better
oﬀ with the centrist party, since the continuation game would lead them to
merge with the extremists. Finally, for intermediate values of the handicap
(if H
¯
≤ h ≤ ¯ H), both outcomes are possible, depending on players beliefs
about the continuation equilibrium.
We summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 4 Suppose that A(1),A (2), A(3) hold.
(i) If 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4, then the unique equilibrium outcome under dual
ballot is as described in Proposition 3.
(ii) If 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6 and h> ¯ H,then the unique equilibrium outcome un-
der dual ballot is a three party system with a centrist party, ({1},{2,3},{4}).
The centrist party wins the election with certainty, and implements the policy
platform q =1 /2.
(iii) If 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6 and h ≤ ¯ H, then two equilibrium outcomes are
possible under dual ballot: either the three party system with a centrist party
described above, or the four party system described in part (i) of Proposition
3
4.1 Dual ballot with endorsement
Here we allow some renegotiation to take place in between the two rounds of
voting. Speciﬁcally, we retain the assumption that the policy cannot be rene-
gotiated in between the two rounds. But we allow the excluded candidates
to endorse one of the candidates admitted to the second round, if the latter
approves. As a result of endorsing, the member of the winning coalitions
share the rents from being in power; as in the previous sections, we assume
16that rents are divided in half. The restriction that policies cannot be rene-
gotiated, although rents can be shared, is is in line with the interpretation
that the policy is dictated by the identity (ideology) of the candidate, which
cannot be changed after the ﬁr s tr o u n d .I ti sa l s oc o h e r e n tw i t ht h ee x p e r i -
ence of many countries, including municipal elections in the Italian case (see
below).
In our context, the consequence of an endorsement is to mobilize the
support of the fraction δ of attached extremist voters. Under our assumption,
these attached extremists vote for the neighboring moderate candidate in
the second round only if there is an explicit endorsement by the extremist
politician. Otherwise they abstain.
Clearly, an excluded extremist politician is always eager to endorse: by
e n d o r s i n gh eh a sn o t h i n gt ol o s e ,b u th ec a ng a i nas h a r eo fr e n t si nt h e
event of a victory. Furthermore, by endorsing, the extremist makes it more
likely that the closer moderate candidate wins, which improves the policy
outcome8. The issue is whether moderate candidates seek an endorsement.
They face a trade-oﬀ: an endorsement brings in the votes of the attached
extremists, but cuts rents in half.
To describe the equilibrium, we work backwards, from a situation in which
the two moderate candidates have passed the ﬁrst ballot (endorsements can
only arise if moderates have not already merged with extremists). We then
ask what this implies for merger decisions before the ﬁr s tb a l l o tt a k e sp l a c e .
Suppose that both 2 and 3 have been endorsed by their extremist neigh-
bors. By our previous assumptions, candidate 2 wins if ε1 + ε2 > 0. When
decisions over endorsements are made, the realization of ε1 is known, but ε2








where the right hand side follows from the assumption that ε2 has a uniform
distribution over [−e/2,e/2]. Notice that (3) also describes the probability
that candidate 2 wins if neither candidate is endorsed, as in this case, by sym-
metry, both moderate candidates lose the same number of attached extremist
voters.
8In a more general dynamic setting with asymmetric information, an extremist can-
didate may prefer to signal his strength and refrain from endorsing, in order to strike a
better deal in future elections (along the lines of Castanheira, 2004). This cannot happen
i no u rm o d e l ,a sw ea s s u m et h a tb o t hα and δ are known parameters and there is a single
period.
17Suppose instead that 3 has been endorsed by 4 while 2 did not seek
the endorsement of 1. Now 2 loses the support of δα voters, the attached
extremists in group 1, while 3 carries all voters in group 4. Hence, repeating
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Hence, an endorsement increases the moderate’s probability of victory
by an amount proportional to the size of attached voters, δα. This gain in
expected utility is oﬀset by the dilution of rents associated with having to
share power. It turns out that whether the gain in probability is worth











where ˇ ε ≶ 0. If ε1 is below the threshold, then the probability of victory
for 2 is so low that he prefers to be endorsed even if this dilutes his rents.
While if ε1 is high enough, he is so conﬁdent of winning that he prefers no
endorsement. Speciﬁcally, the appendix proves:
Lemma 2 Irrespective of what candidate 3 does, candidate2 prefers to
be endorsed by the extremist if ε1 < ˇ ε, and he prefers no endorsement if
ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2 . In between, if ˇ ε ≤ ε1 ≤ ˇ ε +
δα
2 , then 2 prefers to seek the
endorsement of the extremist if 3 has also been endorsed, while 2 prefers no
endorsement if 3 has not been endorsed. Candidate 3 behaves symmetrically
(in the opposite direction), depending on whether −ε1 is below or above these
same thresholds.
Note that ˇ ε is increasing in σλ/R and δα, and decreasing in e. Thus,
endorsements are more likely if the weight given to policy outcomes is large
relative to rents (σλ/R is high), if there are more attached extremist voters
9By (A3), Pr(ε2 >
δα
2 − ε1) < 1a n dP r ( ε2 > −
δα
2 − ε1) > 0 for any ε1 ∈ [−e/2,e/2].
18(δα is high), or if there is less electoral uncertainty (e is small) - because this
incrases the contribution of the extremist voters to ﬁnal victory.
Based on Lemma 2, Proposition 7 in the appendix provides a complete
description of equilibrium endorsements, in the event that both moderate
candidates pass the ﬁrst round.
N e x t ,c o n s i d e rw h a th a p p e n sb e f o r et h eﬁrst round. Again, start back-
wards, and suppose that the moderate candidates bargain with the extremists
over party formation. Now, the moderates lose any incentive to merge with
the extremists before the ﬁrst round of elections. By (A2), they know that
they will always make it to the second round. They also know that, after the
ﬁrst round, they will always be able to get the endorsement of the extrem-
ists if they wish to do so, since the extremists are eager to share the rents
from oﬃce. But waiting until after the ﬁrst round gives the moderates an
additional option: if the shock ε1 is suﬃciently favorable, then they can run
alone in the second round as well, without having to share the rents from
oﬃce. This option of waiting has no costs, since the extremists are always
willing to endorse. Hence the option of waiting and running alone in the
ﬁrst round of elections is always preferred by the moderate candidates to the
alternative of merging with the extremists.10 We summarize this discussion
in the following:
Proposition 5 Suppose that stage two of bargaining is reached. Then the
unique equilibrium outcome at the ﬁrst electoral ballot is a four party sys-
tem where all candidates run alone and each moderate candidate passes the
ﬁrst post with probability 1/2 on a policy platform that coincides with his
bliss point. After the ﬁrst round of elections, endorsements by the extremists
take place on the basis of the realization of the shock ε1 as described in the
appendix.
Finally, in light of this result, consider the ﬁrst stage, where the two
moderates bargain over the formation of a centrist party. If λ>1/4, then as
above the electorate is too polarized to sustain the emergence of a centrist
party, and bargaining moves to stage 2 (and then to the four candidates run-
ning alone at the ﬁrst electoral ballot). If instead 1/6 <λ≤ 1/4, then the
10If (A2) did not hold and the moderates were unsure of passing the ﬁrst round, then they
might prefer to strike a deal with the extremists before any vote is taken. The equilibrium
would then be similar to that of the previous subsection, without endorsements. Details
a r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
19centrist party is feasible. By forming the centrist party the two moderate
candidates win with certainty but have to share the rents in half and achieve
some policy convergence. By giving up on this opportunity, the two mod-
erate candidates know that they would end up in the equilibrium outcome
described in Proposition 5. Here, each moderate candidate passes the post
with probability 1/2 on his preferred policy platform; but his expected share
of rents is now strictly less than R/2, since with some positive probability
the moderate party is forced to seek the endorsement of the extremist and
this dilutes his expected rents (or alternatively, if the ﬁr s tb a l l o ts h o c ki ss o
favorable that the moderate rejects the endorsement, his expected probabil-
ity to win is less than 1/2 since his opponent will accept the endorsement).
Hence, forming the centrist party always strictly dominates the alternative
of running separately at the ﬁrst round of elections. The centrist party is
formed with certainty on a policy platform that is tilted towards the bliss
point of the agenda setter, whoever he is (since there are positive expected
gains from forming the centrist party, these gains accrue to the agenda setter
in the centrist party).
We summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 6 (i) If 1/2 ≥ λ>1/4, then the unique equilibrium outcome
under dual ballot is as described in Proposition 5.
(ii) If 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6 , then the unique equilibrium outcome under dual
b a l l o ti sat h r e ep a r t ys y s t e mw i t hac e n t r i s tp a r t y({1},{2,3},{4}). The cen-
trist party wins the election with certainty, and implements a policy platform
that depends on the identity of the agenda setter inside the centrist party.
4.2 Single and dual ballot compared
Summing up, the equilibria unders single vs dual ballot entail relevant dif-
f e r e n c e s ,b o t ho nt h en u m b e ro fp a r t i e sa n do np o l i c yp l a t f o r m s .
Consider ﬁrst the number of parties running for election, and suppose
that the electorate is suﬃciently polarized (λ>1/4). The single ballot yields
a two party system, each resulting from the merger of moderates and ex-
tremists. Under a dual ballot, instead, we either have four candidates for
sure if endorsements are feasible, or we can have both a four candidate or
a two party system in equilibrium (depending on parameter values), if en-
dorsements are not feasible. Thus, if the electorate is suﬃciently polarized,
the number of candidates is generally smaller under the single ballot.
20If instead the electorate is not very polarized (1/4 ≥ λ), then an equi-
librium with a centrist party always exists under both electoral systems and
regardless of whether endorsements are feasible or not after the ﬁrst ballot.
Under the dual ballot and ruling out the possibility of endorsments, for some
p a r a m e t e rv a l u e sw ea l s oh a v eaf o u rc a ndidate equilibrium. Thus, again the
equilibrium number of parties is either the same or strictly smaller under the
single ballot.
The diﬀerences are even more striking with respect to equilibrium policy
outcomes. If the electorate is suﬃciently polarized (λ>1/4), then the
dual ballot entails more moderate expected policies than the single ballot,
irrespective of the number of parties running for election and whether or not
endorsements are feasible after the ﬁrst round. If instead the electorate is not
very polarized (1/4 ≥ λ), then equilibrium policy outcomes do not depend
on the electoral rule, except in the four candidate equilibrium that also exists
under the dual ballot but not in the single ballot (see above).
Below we take some of these predictions to the data. But before doing so,
we discuss the robustness of these results to alternative assumptions about
t h er e l a t i v es i z eo fm o d e r a t ev se x t r e m i s tg r o u p s .
5 Moderates as the smaller parties
Our assumption that there are more moderate than extremist voters is in line
with the distribution of ideological preferences observed in most countries.
Neverthless, the assumption plays a crucial role in the derivation of the result
on policy moderation under the dual ballot. The reason is that this electoral
system gives an advantage to the larger parties, who are more likely to pass
the ﬁrst round. This section brieﬂy discusses whether the result on policy
moderation survives under alternative assumptions about the relative size of
e x t r e m i s t sv sm o d e r a t ev o t e r s .
Although anything can happen under very general assumption on the
distribution of voters’ preferences, there remains a reason why the dual ballot
can induce policy moderation even if the moderate groups are smaller than
the extremists. Moderates have an option that the extremists do not have:
they can bargain with each other over the formation of a centrist party. The
dual ballot can strengthen the incentives for the emergence of a centrist party,
and in this way it can induce more policy moderation than the single ballot.
The basic reason is that under the dual ballot what matters is not to win the
21ﬁrst round, but to pass it and and to win the ﬁnal elections. And a centrist
party that manages to pass the ﬁrst round has a larger probability to win
the ﬁnal elections, as it can then collect the voters of the excluded extremist
party11.
To illustrate this point, consider the following version of the model. Sup-
pose that moderates have size α and extremists size α,w i t hα < α, exactly
the reverse of what we assumed in section 2. Suppose further that the shock
η = ε1 + ε2 changes the relative size of the two larger groups, now the ex-
tremists, in the same symmetric way described in section 2. The size of the
two centrist groups remains ﬁxed at α. Everything else is kept unchanged, in-
cluding the distribution of the shock, assumptions (A1-A3), and the sequence
of bargaining. So, moderates ﬁr s tb a r g a i na m o n gt h e ma n dt h e n( p o s s i b l y )




> (α − 2α) > 0( A 4 )
The second inequality implies that a single extremist group is larger (in ex-
pected value) than the sum of the two moderates. The ﬁrst inequality implies
that, at each ballot, electoral uncertainty is large enough to modify this rank-
ing for some realization of the shock.12 We also assume that 1/4 ≥ λ>1/6,
so that a viable centrist party is feasible (there exists a centrist policy plat-
form which would be preferred by all moderate voters to the extremist bliss
points). Consider then again the two electoral rules.
Under the single ballot, moderate candidates never form a centrist party
at stage 1 and prefer to move to stage 2. The reason is that, under our
assumptions on the distribution of the electoral shock and by (A.4), a centrist
party, while viable, would always be defeated at the single ballot elections
by one of the two extremists -whover happens to beneﬁt from the electoral
shock. On the other hand, if moderates decide to go on to stage 2, they
now become essential players in the moderate-extremist coalitions, and it is
easy to see that Proposition 1 goes through unchanged. Thus, a two party
system with a coalition of extremists and moderates on each side will form,
each winning with probability 1
2, and each of the policies preferred by the
four candidates will be implemented with equal probability.
11In a diﬀerent modelling context, the same intuition explains the result of greater
moderation of policy under the dual ballot system in Osborne and Slivinski (2001).
12Assumption (A4) is consistent with (A1-A2) if ¯ α/2 >α> ¯ α/3.
22But consider now the dual ballot without endorsements. Suppose that a
centrist party is formed. If one of the extremist parties is hit by a large enough
negative shock (if −ε1 > α − 2α), the centrist party passes the ﬁrst round
and goes to the second round. Given the assumptions on the distribution of
ε1, this occurs with probability p1 =1−
2(α−2α)
e , a strictly positive number
by (A.4). The centrist party will then win the ﬁnal ballot if:
α + ε1 + ε2 < 2α +( 1− δ)(α − ε1 − ε2)
Let p2 be the probability of this event, and notice that p2 =0 ,i fδ ≥
(2 − ¯ α
α+e
4) ≡ δ and p2 =1 ,i fδ ≤
2(α−e)
(α−e) ≡ δ. Thus, for δ>δ>δwe have
1 >p 2 > 0. In words, and quite intuitively, if the share of the attached voters
is not too large, the centrist party could win the second round, although it
had no chance of gaining plurality under the single ballot. The reason is that
here the centrist party attracts the voters of the excluded extremist party.
Next, consider the ﬁrst stage of bargaining, where the moderates choose
whether to form the centrist party or to negotiate with the extremists. This
choice depends on their expected utility under the two scenarios. It can be
shown that the moderates prefer the centrist party if p1p2 > 1
2.I n s p e c t i o no f
p2 shows this is certainly a possibility; for instance, for δ ≤ δ , this condition
is satisﬁed if e
4 > (α − 2α), that is, if the moderate voters, when joining
forces, are suﬃciently close in size to each extremist party.
This example is rather artiﬁcial, of course. Other examples could be con-
structed, with similar or diﬀerent implications. But it illustrates a general
insight. Moderate parties have an option that is precluded (or more dif-
ﬁcult) to the extremists: namely, the two moderates can merge, while the
two extremists cannot. The dual ballot increases the attractiveness of this
option, because it allows the centrist party to gain the voters of one of the
two extremists groups, if it can make it to the second round. Through this
channel, the dual ballot can lead to less extreme policy outcomes even if the
moderate voters are a minority13.
13Moreover one would expect that the dual ballot system, in addition to make more
likely the formation of a moderate party, would also strenghten the moderate bargaining
power when contracting with the extremists, thus leading to more moderate policies even
if the two coalitions moderate-extremist form. We cannot consider this issue here because
of our assumed bargaining structure (if stage 2 of the game is reached, the moderates
have already given up the possibility of forming a moderate party).
236 Evidence from Italian municipal elections
Here we test one of the theoretical predictions, namely that the number
of parties standing for election is larger under the dual ballot compared to
t h es i n g l eb a l l o t . W ee x p l o i tar e f o r min municipal elections in Italy, that
introduced single and dual ballot elections for cities of diﬀerent size. First
we outline the institutions, then we analyze the data.
6.1 The electoral rules
Until 1993, municipal elections in Italy were ruled by a pure proportional
parliamentary system. Voters voted for parties to elect the municipal leg-
islature (Council); the Council then elected the Mayor and the municipal
executive. Since 1993, the Major has been directly elected, with a single bal-
lot for municipalities below 15,000 inhabitants, and with a dual ballot above
this threshold. The system for electing the Council also changed as well.
Speciﬁcally, below the threshold, each party (or coalition) presents one
candidate for Mayor and a list of candidates for the Council. Voters cast
a single vote for the Mayor and his supporting Council list (they can also
express preference votes over that list). The candidate who gets more votes,
becomes Mayor and his list gains 2/3 of all seats in the Council.
Above the threshold, the electoral rule is more complex. Parties (or coali-
tions) present lists of candidates for the Council, and declare their support
t oas p e c i ﬁc candidate for Mayor. But each candidate for Major can be
supported by more than one Council list. There are two rounds of voting.
At the ﬁrst round, voters cast two votes, one for the Major and one for the
Council list, and the two votes may be disjoint (i.e. they are allowed to vote
for say Major A and a list supporting Major B); again, they can express a
preference vote over the Council list. If a candidate for Major gets more
than 50% of votes at the ﬁrst round, s-he is elected. Otherwise, the two top
candidates run again in a second round. In this second ballot, the vote is
only over the Mayor, not the Counci lists. In between the two rounds of vot-
ing, Council lists supporting the excluded candidates for Major are allowed
to endorse one of the remaining two candidates (if he agrees). Seats to the
Council are allocated according to complicated rules, that generally entail a
premium for the lists supporting the winning candidate for Major, but also
take into account the votes received by the lists in the ﬁrst round. Thus, this
electoral rule is very similar to the dual ballot with endorsements described
24in the model, except for the complications concerning the Council lists.
6.2 The data
Our sample covers municipalities in Lombardia (the largest region in North-
ern Italy) from 1988 to 2004. Thus, the sample includes elections before and
after the 1993 reform. To identify the eﬀect of the electoral system, we focus
on municipalities of similar size, neglecting the very small and very large
municipalities. Thus, we only included municipalities with a population be-
tween 8,000 and 50,000 inhabitants (the threshold is 15,000). This gives us
118 municipalities below and 70 above the threshold. We also consider a
smaller sample of cities with 12,000 to 18,000 inhabitants.14
How many voters are ”attached”? An important assumption of the
model is that at least some voters are not ”attached”, in that they vote for
a second best candidate in the second round if their preferred candidate did
not pass the ﬁrst turn. If all voters were attached (if δ = 1 in the model),
then dual and single ballot would yield the same equilibria. To check that
this assumption is consistent with the data, we compare the votes cast in
the ﬁrst and second round for each dual ballot election that had two rounds
of voting. In Figure 1, we plot the total votes received in the ﬁrst round
by all the excluded candidates (on the horizontal axis), against the drop
in participation between the ﬁrst and second rounds (on the vertical axis).
Voting for losers in the ﬁrst round is substantial, ranging from 5% to almost
60%, with a median value around 30%. And the participation rate in the
ﬁrst round is always higher than in the second one, with an average drop
in participation between the two rounds of about 15% of eligible voters.
But most of the scatter plots lie well below the 45◦ line, meaning that in
most elections the drop in participation between the two rounds is much
smaller than the votes received by the excluded candidates. Thus, Figure 1
suggests that a large fraction of those who voted for losers in the ﬁrst round
participated again in the second round.
Under the assumptions that all those who voted in the second round also
participated in the ﬁrst one, and that all those who voted for the top two
14Unfortunately, we could not ﬁnd a policy indicator with which to test the other central
prediction of the model, concerning the moderating eﬀect of the dual ballot. The reason is
that the policy prerogatives of municipal governments in Italy cannot easily be captured
by a policy indicator that reﬂects ideological diﬀerences between left and right.
25candidates in the ﬁrst round also participated in the second round, we can
compute the fraction of attached voters (the parameter δ in the model) as
the ratio between the drop in participation and the vote to the excluded
candidates.15 The median value of this ratio in our sample is 45%. Of
course, a violation in one or the other assumption would result in an upward
or downward bias in the estimate.
Altogether, these numbers suggest that a substantial share of those who
vote for losers in the ﬁrst round vote again for one of the surviving candidates
in the second round, in line with the assumption of the model.
The number of parties One of the results of the theory is that the the
number of parties standing for election is higher under the dual ballot than
under the single ballot. Is this consistent with the evidence?
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the number of candidates for
Major and number of lists for the Council, before and after the reform, and for
municipalities above and below the threshold of 15,000 inhabitants. Before
the reform, and after the reform in the single ballot elections (i.e., below the
threshold of 15,000 inhabitants), each candidate for Major is supported by a
single Council list, hence the number of candidates and the number of lists
coincide. In the dual ballot elections, instead, a candidate for Major can
be supported by several Council lists, hence the number of lists exceeds the
number of candidates. As can be seen from Table 1, bigger municipalities
have more candidates and more lists, and this is true both before and after
the reform. The reform is associated with a reduction in the number of
candidates (and lists) in the smaller municipalities, that adopted the single
ballot. In the bigger municipalities, that adopted the dual ballot, the number
of lists increased, but the number of candidates dropped. Overall, these
statistics provide only limited support for the predictions of the theory. The
number of lists clearly increases after the reform in the dual ballot elections,
but the number of candidates does not. Dual ballot elections do have more
candidates than single ballot, but the eﬀect of the electoral rule is confounded
by diﬀerences in size, and even before the reform bigger municipalities had a
larger number of candidates.
To identify the eﬀect of the electoral rule separately from the eﬀect of
15In some cases, those participating in the second round may be attached voters who
vote for a candidate endorsed by their party. But in our sample endorsements are a rare
event.
26city size, we then estimate a multivariate regression. Speciﬁcally, in Tables
2a and 2b we regress the number of lists (and candidates) on population and
population squared, plus other dummy variables. Columns 1 and 3 refer to
all municipalities in the sample, respectively after and before the reform. We
a r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h ed u m m yv a r i a b l eAbove 15000, that equals one if the
municipality is above the threshold of 15,000 inhabitants, and 0 otherwise.
Fixed eﬀects are included for the election year, but not for the municipality
because they are practically collinear with the dummy variable Above 15000
(only one or two municipalities switch from below to above the threshold
during this period). The estimated coeﬃcient of Above 15000 is signiﬁcant
and with a positive sign, as expected, but only after the reform. Columns 2
and 4 repeat the same excercise, restricting attention to municipalities of size
between 12000 and 18000 inhabitants, to identify the eﬀect of the electoral
rule from the discontinuity in the threshold of 15000 inhabitants. Again, the
variable Above 15000 has a positive and signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcient, but
only after the reform. The estimates imply that switching from a single to a
dual ballot increase the number of candidates of Major by one, and increase
the number of Council lists by two or four, depending on the samples. The
ﬁnding that the eﬀect of the threshold is positive and signiﬁcant only after the
reform suggests that we are really identifying a causal eﬀect of the electoral
rule.
Finally, column 5 pools together all years and all municipalities. Here we
are interested in the dummy variables Dual ballot and Single ballot,d e ﬁned
as 0 before the reform, and as 1 after the reform if above / below the 15000
inhabitants threshod respectively. Thus, the estimated coeﬃcients on these
variables capture the eﬀetc of switching from the old proportional rule to
the new plurality rule, dual or single ballot respectively. Here we include a
municipality ﬁxed eﬀect, but not the year ﬁxed eﬀects (that are likely to be
correlated with the adoption of the electoral reform). Thus, we identify the
eﬀect of the electoral rule from the within municipality variation only. The
estimated ceﬃcients reveal that switching from PR to pluralitry rule with a
single ballot reduces both the number of candidates for Major as well as the
number of Council lists. Switching from PR to a Dual ballot, instead, has
opposite eﬀects on the number of Council lists (that increases) and on on the
number of candidates for Major (it goes down).
Overall, thus, these estimates are strongly consistent with the theoretical
predictions concerning the number of parties in single ballot vs dual ballot
elections.
277 Concluding remarks
We compared dual vs single ballot elections. With a highly polarized elec-
torate, the dual ballot reduces the policy infuence of extremist groups. This
happens because the dual ballot allows the moderate parties to run on their
own policy platform without being forced to strike a compromise with the
neighboring extremists. This also implies that the number of parties sepa-
rately running for election is larger under the dual ballot than with a single
ballot. The evidence from Italian municipal elections is consistent with this
last prediction, on the number of candidates.
The model is built on two central assumptions. First, voters vote sin-
cerely. Relaxing this assumption would lead to many equilibria, and would
probably alter the main results. But we are not too apolegetic about our
approach. While the assumption that everyone votes sincerely may be too
simplistic, the opposite assumption that everyone votes strategically is even
more implausible.16 Allowing some but not all voters to be strategic would
be interesting, but it would open the doors to even more ambiguities.
Second, although we study how pre-existing parties form alliances and
merge, we don’t allow entry of new candidates. Relaxing this assumption
might yield additional insights, and our basic model could be adapted to allow
for entry of new candidates, along the lines of Morelli (2002) and Osborne
and Slivinski (2001). But it is not clear why this extension should radically
change the main results on single vs dual ballot elections. We leave it as a
promising direction for future research.
8 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 To formally prove Proposition 1, we need to com-
pute the expected utilities of all parties in all possible party conﬁgurations.
We need some extra notation. Let EV P
i be the expected utility of party P
under party conﬁguration i, for i = II,IIIa,IIIb,IV, where: II refers to
the two party conﬁguration ({1,2},{3,4}),I V the four party conﬁguration
({1},{2},{3},{4}), IIIa, the three party conﬁguration ({1,2},{3},{4});
16With reference to US elections in 1970-2000, Degan and Merlo (2006) estimate that
only 3% of individual voting proﬁles are inconsistent with sincere voting, a ﬁgure well
below measurement error. Sinclair (2005) estimates a bigger fraction of strategic voters in
UK elections, but still of limited empirical relevance.
28and IIIb,the three party conﬁguration ({1},{2},{3,4}). T h e s ea r et h eo n l y
possibile outcomes once the second stage of bargaining is reached. We now
write down the players’ expected utility in all party conﬁgurations, taking
for granted that any merger will only form on platforms that satisfy (??).
4p a r t i e s({1},{2},{3},{4})
Given assumption (A.1), the two extremist parties don’t have a chance,
and the election is won with probability 1/2 by one of the two moderate















3p a r t i e s({1},{2},{3,4}).
By assumption (A2), groups 3 and 4 together are larger than either group
2 or group 1 alone, for all realizations of η. Moreover, given that λ>1/6,
voters in groups 3 and 4 always vote for the coalition {3,4} rather than for
candidate 2. This means that the coalition {3,4} wins the election with




























T h eo t h e rt h r e ep a r t yo u t c o m e( {1,2},{3},{4}) is symmetric to this one
and can easily be computed
2p a r t i e s({1,2},{3,4}).
If both coalitions form, each coalition wins with probability 1
2. The equi-
librium payoﬀsf o rt h e4p a r t i e sd e p e n d so nw h i c hp o l i c yi sa g r e e du p o ni n




























M o d e r a t e sa sa g e n d as e t t e r s .
It is easy to verify that the extremist is always better oﬀ to accept to
merge with the nearby moderate than to say no, on any common policy
platform and irrespective of what he expects the other two players to do. This
is because under A.1 and A.3 the extremist can never win if he runs alone
and the policy. Hence, if the moderates decide to merge with the extremists,
they will always oﬀer to do so at the moderates’ bliss point. Comparing
the previous expressions for the expected utilities under the possible party
conﬁgurations, it can be shown that the moderate is also better oﬀ to merge
on a platform that coincides with his own bliss point, rather than to run alone,
irrespective of what the other two players on the opposite side of 1/2 are
expected to do. Hence, the unique equilibrium is a two party conﬁguration
({1,2},{3,4}), where each party runs on a platform that coincides with the
moderate’s bliss point.
Extremists as agenda setters
Comparing the previous expressions, we have:
i) EV 2
II >E V2
IIIb for any q34 ∈ [t3,t 4]a n da n yq12 ∈ [t1,t 2]I nw o r d s ,i f2
expects that 3 and 4 have merged, then he always prefer to merge with 1 on
any feasible platform that does not entail losing the support of his moderate
voters.
ii) EV 2
IIIa R EV 4
IV, depending on the value of q12 ∈ [t1,t 2]. That is,
if 2 expects 3 and 4 to run alone, then his preferred outcome depends on
the common platform q12 that he is oﬀered by 1. But there is a value of
q12 ∈ [t1,t 2]t h a ti n d u c e sm o d e r a t ep a r t y2t op r e f e rt om e r g ew i t h1 .C l e a r l y ,
EV 2
IIIa is higher the closer is q12 to t2.
To rule out multiple equilibria sustained by implausible beliefs by the
moderates, here we have to invoke the restriction on beliefs discussed in the
text (the independence property as deﬁned by Battigalli 1996)). Namely, the
moderate’s (say 2) expectation about whether the other two players (3 and
4) will merge does not depend on the proposal he has received. Under this
30restriction, the only expectation by player 2 consistent with equilibrium is
that the other two parties (3 and 4) will merge. The reason is that, as dis-
cussed above, the other agenda setter (say 4) always prefers to merge, on any
policy platform acceptable by his moderate couterpart, and by ii), he can al-
ways ﬁnd an acceptable proposal. Hence, the unconditional expectation that
the other parties (3 and 4) will fail to merge is inconsistent with equilibrium
behavior by 3 and 4. Given the unconditional expectation that 3 and 4 will
merge, by i) the moderate party 2 is willing to merge with 1 on any proposed
platform in the range [t1,t 2]. Thus, here too, the unique equilibrium is a
two party conﬁguration, where the extremist agenda setters simultaneoulsy
propose to their respective moderates to merge on a platfrom that coincides
with the extremits’ bliss points, and these proposals are always accepted by
the moderates.17QED
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 Suppose that candidates 3 and 4 have merged, while
candidate 2 runs alone. Consider the second round of voting. Given the
behavior of the attached extremists in group 1, candidate 2 wins if:
(1 − δ)α + α + ε1 + ε2 >α+ α − ε1 − ε2 (8)
or more succinctly if:
η ≡ ε1 + ε2 >δ α /2
Since η is distributed over the interval [−e,e] with distribution (2), this event
has probability :
1 − Pr(η ≤ δα/2) = 1 − G(δα/2) = 1/2 − h





Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that the second stage of bargaining is
reached. Extremist candidates are always better oﬀ in a two party system,
s i n c ei ft h e yr u na l o n et h e yh a v en oc h a n c e so fw i n n i n g .T h ei s s u ei sw h e t h e r
moderate candidates prefer to merge with the extremists or not, and on what
policy platform.
17If λ>1/4, the equilibrium would be unique even without the restriction on beliefs.
The reason is that in this case the moderates would always be better oﬀ to merge on the
extremist’s platfrom, rather than to run alone, irrespective of their beliefs about what the
other two players do.
31Moderates as agenda setters Suppose ﬁrst that the moderate can-
didates are the agenda setter inside each prospective coalition. Consider
candidate 2, given that 3 and 4 have merged. If candidate 2 runs alone,
a se x p l a i n e di nt h et e x t ,h ew i n sw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 /2 − h. If he wins, he
i m p l e m e n t sh i sb l i s sp o i n ta n de n j o y st h er e n t sf r o mo ﬃce, R. If he loses, he
gets no rents and the policy implemented is t3 =1 /2+λ. Hence, using the
same notation as in the proof of Proposition 1, candidate 2’s expected utility










I fi n s t e a dc a n d i d a t e2m e r g e sw i t h1a n di m p l e m e n t si t sp r e f e r r e dp o l i c y ,
then their party wins with probability 1/2, but then candidate 2 has to
share the rents from oﬃce with the other party member. Hence, candidate








Comparing these two expressions, we see that 2 is indiﬀerent between









, candidate 2 prefers to run alone, given that 3 and 4 have
merged, while if h>H
¯
, candidate 2 prefers to merge, given that 3 and 4
have merged.
Next, consider candidate 2’s alternatives if candidates 3 and 4 do not








If instead candidate 2 merges with 1 and is the agenda setter inside his
coalition, given that 3 and 4 have not merged, than party {1,2} wins with













Comparing the last two expressions, we see that 2 is indiﬀerent between these
two options if




32For h< ¯ H, candidate 2 prefers to run alone, given that 3 and 4 have not
merged; while for h> ¯ H, 2 prefers to merge with 1, given that 3 and 4 have
not merged and that 2 is the agenda setter.
Comparing (9) and (11), we see that ¯ H> H
¯
. This makes sense: running
alone is more attractive (i.e., the threshold of indiﬀerence is higher) if the




, the handicap from running alone is so small that both moderate
candidates always prefer not to merge with the extremists. In this case, if
the second stage of bargaining is reached and the moderate candidates are
drawn to be agenda setters, the equilibrium is unique and we have a four
party system.
If h> ¯ H, the handicap from running alone is so large that both moderate
candidates always prefer to merge with the extremists. In this case, if the
second stage of bargaining is reached and the moderate candidates are agenda
setters, the equilibrium is again unique, and we have a two party system on
the moderates’ policy platforms.
Finally, if H
¯
≤ h ≤ ¯ H, then multiple equilibria are possible, given that
the second stage of bargaining is reached and the moderate candidates are
agenda setters. Depending on the players’ expectations about what the other
candidates are doing, we could have both a two party or a four party system.
In all these cases, the policy platforms inside the coalitions coincide with
those of the moderate candidates since the extremists are always willing to
merge.
Extremists as agenda setters Next, suppose that extremist candi-
dates are the agenda setters. Let q34 ∈ [1/2+λ,1] denote the policy proposal
for party {3,4} and q12 ∈ [0,1/2 − λ] the policy proposal for party {1,2}.
These policies need not coincide with the extremist candidates bliss points,
since the extremists may have to deviate from their bliss points to get their
proposals accepted. Our goal is to establish conditions under which such pro-
posals might or might not be accepted by the moderate candidates. Again,
we focus attention on candidate 2, under diﬀerent expectations about what
happens in the opposing party, since the extremists are alway better oﬀ when
they merge.
Suppose that candidate 2 expects party {3,4} to be formed on the policy
platform q34. Going through the same steps as above, candidate 2’s expected































2 − λ − q12)+R/2
2σ(q34 − 1
2 + λ)+2 R
(12)
Thus, if candidate 2 expect coalition 3,4 to be formed, he prefers to run alone
(to merge) if h<H (q12,q 34)( i fh>H (q12,q34)). Note that H(.)i ss t r i c t l y
decreasing in both arguments. Intuitively, as q12 increases it approaches
candidate’s 2 bliss point and the merger becomes more attractive; while as
q34 increases it gets further away from candidate’s 2 bliss point, and this too
makes the merger more attractive for candidate 2 (since losing the election
would cause more disutility).
By symmetry, if two parties are formed, in equilibrium the policy plat-
forms agreed upon by each coalition must have the same distance from 1/2.




2 − λ − q)+R/2
2σ(1
2 + λ − q)+2 R
(13)
for q ∈ [0,1/2 − λ] and where the M superscript serves as a reminder that
2 expects his opponents to merge. It is easy to see that H
¯
≤ HM(q)f o ra n y
q ∈ [0,1/2−λ], where the ﬁrst inequality is strict if q<1/2−λ and it holds
with the equal sign at the point q =1 /2 − λ. Moreover, HM
q (q) < 0. Thus,






2 + λ)+2 R
The policy q = 0 is the point of most extreme symmetric extremism; at
this choice, q12 and q34 coincide with the extremist candidates bliss points, 0
a n d1r e s p e c t i v e l y .I nw o r d s ,a st h ep o l i c yq approved inside each coalition
becomes symmetrically more extreme, a merger becomes less attractive for
34the moderate candidates, given that they expect a symmetric merger to be
formed by their opponent. Hence, they will be more willing to run alone
and refuse the merger, even if they expect a merger to occur in the opposing
coalition.
Suppose now that candidate 2 does not expect a merger to occur in coali-
tion 3,4. If he runs alone, either himself or the other moderate party wins
with probability 1
2. Hence his expected utility is the same as in (10) above.
If he instead accepts the oﬀer from candidate 1 to form a coalition at
policy q12, his expected utility, given the expectation that the coalition 3,4




















w h i c hi sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fq12. Candidate 2 will then be indiﬀerent





2 − λ − q)+R/2
2σ(q − 1
2 +3 λ)+R
for q ∈ [0,1/2 − λ] and where the A superscript serves as a reminder that
2 expects his opponents to merge.Candidate 2 will then accept 1’s oﬀer if
h ≥ HA(q)a n dr e f u s e si ti fh<H A(q). Clearly, HA
q (q) < 0a n d ¯ H ≤ HA(q),
with equality at q = 1
2 − λ.
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium if the extremists are
agenda setters and stage two of bargaining is reached. Speciﬁcally:
If h<H
¯
, then there is no feasible oﬀer by an extremist that can induce
a moderate candidate to merge with him, whatever the moderate’s expecta-
tions about the other coalition. This can be seen by noting that, as discussed
above, H
¯
≤ HM(q),H A(q)f o ra l lq ∈ [0,1/2−λ]. Hence, the unique equilib-
rium is a 4 party system with all candidates running alone.
If h> ¯ H, then the moderate candidate, say candidate 2, always prefers
to merge with the extremist on at least some (though not necessarily all)
feasible policy platforms, whatever his expectations on the other coalition’s
behaviour. This can be seen by noting that HM(q) ≤ ¯ H f o ra tl e a s ts o m e
q ∈ [0,1/2 − λ], and HA(q)= ¯ H at the point q =1 /2 − λ. By symmetry,
candidate 2 will rationally expect that the other coalition will always be
formed. He would then accept any oﬀer q by candidate 1 such that h ≥
HM(q). Hence, the unique equilibrium is a two party system with a merger
between extremists and moderates taking place on both sides.
35The extremists candidates who act as agenda setters will then impose
the policy platforms closest to their bliss points, subject to getting their
proposal accepted. Since HM(0) S ¯ H, the equilibrium platform in this case
varies with the value of h.I fh ≥ HM(0), then both coalitions will form on
the extremist candidates bliss points, 0 and 1 for coalitions {1,2} and {3,4}
respectively. If h<H M(0), then coalition {1,2} will form on the policy q∗
∈ [0,1/2 − λ] such that h = HM(q∗), while coalition {3,4} will form on the
symmetric policy 1 − q∗. This can seen by noting that any policy q0 <q ∗
would not be accepted by candidate 2 (since by (12) h<H(q0,q∗)), and any
policy q00 >q ∗ would be accepted by candidate 2 (since by (12) h>H(q00,q∗))
but suboptimal for candidate 1 who is the agenda setter. Since HM





q ≤ 0, with strict inequality if h<H M(0). Thus, as
h rises the equilibrium policy falls towards the extremists bliss point (or it
r e m a i n sc o n s t a n ti fi ti sa l r e a d ya tt h ee x t r e m i s t ’ sb l i s sp o i n t ) .
Finally, if H
¯
≤ h ≤ ¯ H,then two equilibrium outcomes are possible in pure
strategies. (i) If the moderate candidate expects his moderate opponent to
run alone, he also prefers to run alone (since h ≤ ¯ H ≤ HA(q)). Hence
we have a four party equilibrium.(ii) If the moderate candidate expects his
opponents to merge, then he also prefers to merge rather than running alone
(since H
¯
= HM(1/2−λ) ≤ HM(q) ≤ h f o ra tl e a s ts o m eq). Going through
the argument in previous paragraph, the equilibrium policy platform in this
case coincides with the extremist’s bliss point if h ≥ HM(0), and it is q∗ such
that h = HM(q∗)i fh<H M(0). (Again, recall that HM(0) S ¯ H,d e p e n d i n g
on paramter values).QED
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 Suppose that neither moderate candidate has been















If instead candidate 2 has been endorsed while candidate 3 has not, then the























provided that the ﬁrst expression in brackets is strictly less than 1 and the




36If instead ε1 > e
2 −
δα
2 , then the probability that 2 wins is 1 and his expected
utility reduces to R/2.18
Candidate 2 is indiﬀerent between these two alternatives if:










If ε1 > ˇ ε then candidate 2 strictly prefersn oe n d o r s e m e n t ,g i v e nt h a t3h a s
not been endorsed. While if ε1 < ˇ ε then candidate 2 strictly prefers to be
endorsed, given that 3 has not been endorsed.
Next, suppose that both moderate candidates have been endorsed by the
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Suppose that 3 has been endorsed by 4, while 2 has not been endorsed. Then




















provided that the ﬁrst expression in brackets is strictly positive and the




If instead ε1 < −e
2+
δα
2 , then the probability that 2 wins is 0 and his expected
utility reduces to −2σλ.19
Candidate 2 is then indiﬀerent between these two options if




If ε1 > ˇ ε+
δα
2 then candidate 2 strictly prefers no endorsement, given that 3
has been endorsed. While if ε1 < ˇ ε +
δα
2 then candidate 2 strictly prefers to
be endorsed, given that 3 has been endorsed.
By symmetry, 3 has similar preferences, but in the opposite direction and
with respect to the symmetric thresholds −ˇ ε −
δα
2 and −ˇ ε (eg. 3 prefers
no endorsement, given that 2 has been endorsed, if ε1 < −ˇ ε −
δα
2 , and so
on).QED
18Assumption (A3) implies that the ﬁrst expression in brackets is always positive and
the second one is always less than 1.
19By (A3), the ﬁr s te x p r e s s i o ni nb r a c k e t si sa l w a y ss t r i c t l yl e s st h a n1a n dt h es e c o n d
expression in brackets is always positive.
37Equilibrium with endorsements Here we describe the equilibrium con-
tinuation if the two moderate candidates have passed the ﬁrst round and com-
pete over the second round. Equilibrium endorsements depend on whether
the thresholds in Lemma 2 are positive or negative. Speciﬁcally, under (A1-
A3), we have:
Proposition 7 (i) Suppose that ˇ ε>0. Then the equilibrium is unique and
at least one of the two moderate candidates always seeks the endorsement of
his extremist neighbor. If ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ,ˇ ε +
δα
2 ] then both candidates seek
the endorsement of their extremist neighbor. If ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2 then 3 seeks the
endorsement while 2 does not. If ε1 < −ˇ ε−
δα
2 then 2 seeks the endorsement
while 3 does not.
(ii) Suppose that ˇ ε +
δα
2 < 0. Then the equilibrium is again unique and
at most one of the two moderate candidates seeks an endorsement by his
extremist neighbor. If ε1 ∈ [ˇ ε,−ˇ ε] then no moderate candidate seeks the
endorsement of the extremist. If ε1 > −ˇ ε, then 3 seeks the endorsement of 4
while 2 seeks no endorsement. If ε1 < ˇ ε, then 2 seeks the endorsement of 1
while 3 seeks no endorsement.
(iii) Suppose that ˇ ε +
δα
2 > 0 > ˇ ε. If ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε,ˇ ε], then multiple equilibria
are possible: either both moderate candidates seek an endorsement by their
extremist neighbor or none of them does. For all other realizations of ε1 the
equilibrium is unique. If ε1 ∈ (−ˇ ε,ˇ ε +
δα
2 ] or if ε1 ∈ (ˇ ε,−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ] then both
moderate candidates always seek the endorsement of the extremist. If ε1 > ˇ ε+
δα
2 then 3 seeks the endorsement of 4 while 2 does not seek any endorsement;
and symmetrically, if ε1 < −ˇ ε −
δα
2 then 2 seeks the endorsement of 1 while
3 does not seek any endorsement.
Proof
Suppose ﬁrst that ˇ ε>0. This then implies that 0 > − ˇ ε. This equilibrium
is illustrated in Figure 2. If ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε,ˇ ε], then both moderates ﬁnd it optimal
to seek the endorsement of the extremists, no matter what their opponent
does. If ε1 ∈ (ˇ ε,ˇ ε +
δα
2 ], then candidate 3 still ﬁnds it optimal to seek the
endorsment of 4 no matter what 2 does; and given 3’s behavior, 2 also ﬁnds
it optimal to seek the endorsement of 1. The same conclusion holds, but with
the roles of 2 and 3 reversed, if ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ,−ˇ ε). Finally, if ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2
then candidate 2 ﬁnds it optimal to seek no endorsement no matter what 3
does, while 3 ﬁnds it optimal to seek the endorsement of 4 no matter what 2
38does (since a fortiori ε1 > −ˇ ε). By the same argument, the roles of 2 and 3
are reversed if ε1 < −ˇ ε −
δα
2 .
Next suppose that ˇ ε+
δα
2 < 0. This then implies that −ˇ ε>−ˇ ε−
δα
2 > 0.
This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3. If ε1 ∈ [ˇ ε +
δα
2 ,−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ], then
both moderates ﬁnd it optimal to seek no endorsement, no matter what their
opponent does. If ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ,−ˇ ε), then candidate 2 still ﬁnds it optimal
to seek no endorsment no matter what 3 does; and given 2’s behavior, 3 also
ﬁnds it optimal to seek no endorsement. The same conclusion holds, but
with the roles of 2 and 3 reversed, if ε1 ∈ (ˇ ε,ˇ ε+
δα
2 ]. Finally, if ε1 > −ˇ ε then
candidate 2 still ﬁnds it optimal to seek no endorsement no matter what
3 does (since a fortiori ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2 ), while 3 ﬁnds it optimal to seek the
e n d o r s e m e n to f4n om a t t e rw h a t2d o e s .
Finally, suppose that ˇ ε+
δα
2 > 0 > ˇ ε. This then implies −ˇ ε−
δα
2 < 0 < −ˇ ε.
This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4. For ε1 > ˇ ε +
δα
2 candidate 2
ﬁnds it optimal not to be endorsed, no matter what 3 does, while 3 ﬁnds it
optimal to seek the endorsement of 4 no matter what 2 does (since in this
case ˇ ε+
δα
2 > −ˇ ε). The same holds, but with the roles of 2 and 3 reversed, if
ε1 < −ˇ ε−
δα
2 . If ε1 ∈ (−ˇ ε,ˇ ε+
δα
2 ], then 3 still ﬁnds it optimal to be endorsed
b y4n om a t t e rw h a t2d o e s . A n dg i v e n3 ’ sb e h a v i o r ,n o w2a l s oﬁnds it
optimal to be endorsed. Again, the same holds, but with the roles of 2 and 3
reversed, if ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε −
δα
2 ,ˇ ε). Finally, if ε1 ∈ [−ˇ ε,ˇ ε] then multiple equilibria
are possible, since the optimal behavior of each moderate candidate depends
on what his moderate opponent does. Hence, in equilibrium both seek the
endorsement of their extremist neighbor or none of them does.QED
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41Table 1 – Number of Candidates and Lists: Summary Statistics 
 
 
  Pre reform    Post reform 
Population  Size  < 15K  > 15K  Δ    < 15K  > 15K  Δ 
          
N. Council lists   6.83 8.74 1.91    3.86 9.67 5.80 
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.28)***   (0.06) (0.19) (0.20)***
          
N. candidates for Major  6.83 8.74 1.91    3.86 5.16 1.31 
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.28)***   (0.06) (0.11) (0.12)***
          
Observations 120  73      318  221   
 
Standard errors in parenthesis, *** significant at 1% 
Observations refer to elections 
Δ = Number of (.) in municipalities > 15K  minus Number of (.) in municipalities < 15K 
Post reform electoral system: Dual ballot if population size is >15K, Single ballot if population size is < 15K  
 Table 2a:  Electoral system and number of Council lists 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. variable  Number of Council lists 
       
Above 15000  4.29 1.97 -0.39  -0.01   
  (0.38)*** (0.64)*** (0.46)  (0.88)   
       
Dual ballot      0 . 7 3  
      ( 0 . 2 6 ) * * *  
       
Single ballot      - 3 . 1 6  
      ( 0 . 1 7 ) * * *  
       
Population  1.71 -57.45  3.47 -4.76  7.00 
  (0.62)*** (19.01)***  (0.82)*** (26.90)  (2.40)*** 
       
Population Squared  -0.00 0.00  -0.00 0.00  -0.00 
 (0.00)  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)  (0.00) 
       
Fixed  effects Year Year Year Year Municipality 
Population size  All  12K -18K   All  12K -18K   All 
Years Post-reform  Pre-reform  All  years 
Obs.  539 163 193 49  732 
Adj.  R2  0.71 0.64 0.44 0.07 0.36 
N.  municipal.      188 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Population is measured in 10000 (10K) 
Election year fixed effects included in columns (1-4) 
Municipality fixed effects included in column (5) 
In columns (1-4) the variable Above 15000 equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants and 0 
otherwise 
In column (5) the variable Dual ballot equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants after 1992 
and 0 otherwise, the variable Single ballot equals 1 in the municipalities below 15000 inhabitants after 
1992 and 0 otherwise           Table 2b:  Electoral system and number of candidates for Major 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. variable  Number of candidates for Major  
       
Above 15000  0.90 1.11 -0.41  -0.01   
  (0.21)*** (0.39)*** (0.46)  (0.88)   
       
Dual ballot      -3.49 
      (0.21)*** 
       
Single ballot      -3.06 
      (0.16)*** 
       
Population  0.30 7.55 3.46 -4.76  1.53 
  (0.43) (10.92)  (0.82)***  (26.90)  (2.04) 
       
Population Squared  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00  0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)***  (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Fixed  effects Year Year Year Year Municipality 
Population size  All  12K -18K   All  12K -18K   All 
Years Post-reform  Pre-reform All  years 
Obs.  539 163 193 49  732 
Adj.  R2  0.33 0.25 0.44 0.07 0.58 
N.  municipal.      188 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Population is measured in 10000 (10K) 
Election year fixed effects included in columns (1-4) 
Municipality fixed effects included in column (5) 
In columns (1-4) the variable Above 15000 equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants and 0 
otherwise 
In column (5) the variable Dual ballot equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants after 1992 
and 0 otherwise, the variable Single ballot equals 1 in the municipalities below 15000 inhabitants after 
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